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ABSTRACT
A resilience analysis of protection cycles (p-cycle) configurations for Double Rings with Dual Attachment (DRDAs) archi-
tectures is presented in this work. DRDAs are composed of two rings with corresponding nodes connected by two separated
links. There are several possible configurations of p-cycles, which may be used in DRDAs for improving link or node pro-
tection upon link failure. The values of the parameters Mean Time To Failure and Mean Time To Disconnection are analysed
in the paper to show the best choice of p-cycles in DRDAs architectures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
New optical networking technologies have been more and
more popular in recent years. They can satisfy still increas-
ing user demands for bandwidth [1] but also have to be
resilient and ensure quality of service for high priority con-
nections. There are at least a few well-known solutions
that ensure continuous data transmission in a network even
in the case of link or node failures. For instance, Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 802.17 standard
defines Resilient Packet Rings (RPR) networks [2]. In RPR,
data transmission is realised in both rings simultaneously,
however, in opposite directions. When a failure occurs in
the network, one of two protection mechanisms, that is,
steering (mandatory) or wrapping (optional) is activated.
In the first one, data is redirected to the opposite ring in
the source node, whereas, in the second case, packets are
wrapped to the opposite ring in the node situated next
to the failed element. Because of the topology discovery
protocol, which informs the nodes about the current net-
work topology, it is possible to ensure data transmission
with outages shorter than 50 ms, which is acceptable by
most applications.
In this paper, we focus on the preconfigured protec-
tion cycles (p-cycles). They were proposed in 1998 as
a powerful resilience technique to protect metropolitan
area networks (MANs) against link or node failures [3].
Numerous past studies show the usefulness and advan-
tages of this solution. The practical proposals, as well as
theoretical analyses, have been provided to explain how
this very promising approach performs. Most researchers
use the (Integer Linear Programming model to find the
best p-cycle configurations in a network, for example, in
[4] and [5]. This simple and effective tool sometimes is
used to solve very complex problems. Many new propos-
als regarding p-cycles have been identified in a literature.
The Failure Independent Path-Protecting p-cycle that is
an extension of the original concept is presented in [6].
This solution allows for more capacity efficient network
design than the link protecting p-cycle. The recent work
presented in [7] assumes that the combination of network
coding and p-cycles ensures an effective 1 C N protection
against single-link failures. The authors in [8] prove that
protection by establishing optimised explicit paths allows
for more effective balance of traffic in comparison to the
use of optimised Internet Protocol (IP) routing. In [9], the
schemes for Multiprotocol Label Switching networks that
combine p-cycle and the fast reroute mechanisms are pro-
posed to share the protection bandwidth effectively. The
authors in [10] analysed a multipath protection algorithm
based on the p-cycle mechanism. The obtained results con-
firm that this solution is more efficient than the path-based
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protection concept. However, in [11], the authors propose
a new path-based multipath protection scheme to control
the lengths of paths, which allows for more effective trans-
mission in a network. The paths may also be established
effectively by using the mixed shared protection algorithm
proposed in [12]. There are also many papers in which
authors analyse the possible advantages of p-cycles when
two or even more failures occur in a network. The sim-
ple solution is presented in [13], where two link-disjoint
backup paths are computed for each link. As a result, the
network is protected against two-link failures. The authors
in [14] and [15] focus on the capacity optimization in a
network with p-cycles when two failures are identified.
In [16], the enhanced intelligent p-cycle is proposed to
protect all working light-trees of multicast demands in a
network. The Quality Of Protection for networks with p-
cycles is analysed in [17]. The authors propose five service
classes to protect links against failures. The best one, plat-
inum class, ensures protection of all two-link failures. The
p-cycles that ensure a network survivability when many
(more than two) links fail have been also analysed, for
example, in [18]. In the paper, a few new algorithms have
been proposed to determine the number of disjoint p-cycles
in the network with the same number of non-working
links. In [19], the authors consider single and multiple fail-
ures and propose the new algorithms, which minimise the
capacity consumption in a network protected by p-cycles.
The authors of [20] also try to optimise the process of p-
cycles selection. They use the integer linear programming
and genetic algorithm methods to find the best solutions.
The reliability analysis provides a key metric for choos-
ing the best configuration of p-cycles in a given network
topology [21].
There are two types of link spans protected by p-cycles,
on-cycle and straddling ones (Figure 1). In the first case,
the failing link is a part of a p-cycle. The failure is recov-
ered by redirecting the transmission through the working
spans, which belong to the p-cycle. In the second case,
the failing link does not belong to the p-cycle, but trans-
mission may be continued by using the spans that belong
to the p-cycle. Moreover, in this case, it is possible to
set two routes for redirected traffic, which demonstrates
one of the greatest advantages of p-cycles. Additionally,
the proposed method is fast due to its local character of
protection switching.
In this paper, we propose an analytical model that facil-
itates the selection of an appropriate p-cycle configuration
in the Double Ring with Dual Attachment (DRDA) network
architecture. Although we focus on DRDAs, the presented
method may be easily extended for any other architec-
ture. DRDAs are composed of two rings (the inner and
the outer ring) interconnected via dual attachments, that is,
each node in the inner ring is double linked to its asso-
ciated node in the outer ring. DRDAs were introduced in
[22], whereas, this paper presents the analytical compar-
ison between various p-cycle configurations, for the first
time. We provide the reliability analysis for five p-cycle
configurations and prove that the one that was proposed
and analysed in [22] has the best properties. Moreover,
we show that this solution should be applicable only
for smaller networks, for example, MANs. In wide area
networks, more smaller p-cycle configurations ought to
be considered.
Research on DRDA topologies is an important open
topic because many network operators, such as Telefon-
ica, are currently considering using DRDAs in their MANs.
This interest comes from the fact that it used to be com-
mon to design MANs in a form of one or more rings.
When such topology exists, it is easy to connect two rings
with dual attachments and create a DRDA network. The
research work on DRDA networks was conducted as a part
of the BONE project funded by the European Commission
under the 7th Frame Programme. One of the partners in
this work was Telefonica. Currently, the work on DRDAs
is continued in the TIGER2 project, also with researchers
from Telefonica [23].
Over DRDA topologies, p-cycles may effectively pro-
vide protection in case of failure, thus strengthening its
survivability properties. The number of nodes in a DRDA
network must be divisible by four to allow for establish-
ing the forthcoming p-cycle configurations under study.
Five configurations of p-cycles are considered in the paper
and their effectiveness is compared by means of a reliabil-
ity analysis. The values of the following two metrics are
derived, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and Mean Time To
Disconnection (MTTD). Span repairs are not considered in
the first one, while the second represents the mean time to
achieve a disconnection state, when the connectivity can-
not be guaranteed even though the failed spans are repaired
with certain MTTR (Mean Time To Repair).
This paper is organised as follows. Five possible p-cycle
configurations for DRDAs are proposed in Section 2.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 provide the analysis of MTTF and
MTTD for each p-cycle proposal considered in the paper,
respectively. In Section 3.3, capacity requirements for each
Figure 1. Example of p-cycles. (a) The p-cycle itself, (b) an on-cycle link failure and (c) a straddling link failure.
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Figure 2. Evaluated p-cycle configurations.
p-cycle configuration are presented. Finally, Section 4
concludes the paper.
2. ANALYSED P-CYCLE
CONFIGURATIONS
A k-node DRDA network (with 2k links) can be protected
against link failures by several p-cycle configurations, as
shown in Figure 2. It presents five possibilities that are
analysed and compared in this paper. In case (a), a simple
configuration is considered: two p-cycles, which cover the
inner and the outer ring. Figure 2(b) proposes a different
approach, that is, many (k=2) short (4-links) p-cycles (for
simplicity, only one p-cycle is presented in this case). In
case (c), there are two p-cycles, each spanning over the half
of the network. Case (d) shows two p-cycles, both spanning
through all the nodes in the network (again, only one is
marked). As there is no information exchange between the
p-cycles, each link failure is treated as an on-cycle failure
and is repaired by the p-cycle to which this link belongs.
The last approach, Figure 2(e), presents the solu-
tion introduced in [22], where there are two cooperating
p-cycles. The cooperation means that failures can be
repaired either in the p-cycle in which a failure occurs, or
in the complementary p-cycle, depending on which strat-
egy is more efficient. The cooperation is possible, due to
two features. Firstly, each p-cycle traverses all nodes in
the topology providing full connectivity between any two
nodes in the DRDA. Secondly, p-cycles are link disjoint.
The presented features of p-cycles proposed in case (e)
provide a high level of protection against link failures.
In cases (a) and (c), the established p-cycles do not cover
all the links. k links in case (a) are not protected. In case
(c), k-4 are straddling links protected by p-cycles. It is
expected that in terms of reliability, these configurations
will be inferior compared to the other cases; however, we
decided to include them for the purpose of comparison and
a better overall view. Similarly, all the proposed configura-
tions differ in the amount of spare capacity that is required
to provide full protection. Nevertheless, in this paper, we
focus mainly on the solutions’ effectiveness rather than on
their deployment costs.
3. ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR DRDA
NETWORKS WITH VARIOUS
P-CYCLE CONFIGURATIONS
In this section, we compare the proposed p-cycle configu-
rations in terms of achieved reliability of the network. To
do that, we use commonly known analytical measures, that
is, MTTF and MTTD (Mean Time to Disconnection).
Mean time to failure represents the average amount of
time before the system fails. It is calculated by providing
a function that denotes the probability that the network is
in an irreparable state. MTTD is the average time required
to transition from the original state with no link failures
to the disconnection state. This gives an idea of what
requirements in terms of MTTR should a network opera-
tor demand from its service repair department in order to
achieve a given MTTD.
The first parameter does not consider repairs of failed
links and should be treated as a theoretical reference. Nev-
ertheless, it is a good measure to objectively compare the
topologies. In reality, broken links are repaired. Therefore,
MTTD is more realistic and represents the mean time after
which the connectivity in a network cannot be assured,
given a certain value of MTTR.
3.1. Mean Time To Failure
For the reliability calculations, we use the state enumer-
ation method, that is, we list all possible states and the
sum of their probabilities. In case of MTTF, we model
the behaviour of a system as a Markov chain, where
states are related to different failure situations. We assume
that failures as well as repair processes are memoryless,
and we take into consideration failure/repair intensities in
appropriate transitions. Therefore, we use homogeneous
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Markov chains. The final step to obtain MTTF is the
Laplace transform.
MTTF of a network with p-cycles can be obtained from
the following formula:
MTTF D
Z 1
0
R.t/dt (1)
where R.t/ is an all-terminal reliability function [24].
Equations (2) through (6) present the all-terminal relia-
bility for p-cycles presented in Figure 2.
The (0:0) symbol describes the situation where there is
no failure in a network. The (1:0) symbol indicates one
failure in one of the p-cycles and none in the other. The
remaining symbols are created in a similar way. Only the
cases with all working links and those with failures that
may be protected by p-cycles are considered in formulas 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6. In the formulas, k means the number of nodes,
2k represents the number of links and r.t/ is the reliability
function of a single link.
Ra.t/ D r2k.t/„ƒ‚…
.0:0/
C2  k
2
 r k2 1.t/Œ1r.t/r k2 .t/rk.t/„ ƒ‚ …
.1:0/
C

k
2
 r k2 1.t/  Œ1  r.t/
2
 rk.t/„ ƒ‚ …
.1:1/
(2)
Rb.t/ D
k
2X
iD0
k
2
i
!
 .4r3.t/  Œ1  r.t//i  Œr4.t/ k2 i (3)
Rc.t/ D r2k.t/„ƒ‚…
.0:0/
C2
2
666664r
k
2 C2.t/
k
2 2X
iD0
 
k
i
!
rki.t/.1r.t//i
„ ƒ‚ …
.1:0/
C

k
2
C2

r
k
2 C1.t/.1r.t// 
k
2 2X
iD0
 
k
i
!
rki.t/.1r.t//i
„ ƒ‚ …
.1:1/
3
777775 (4)
Rd.t/ D r2k.t/„ƒ‚…
.0:0/
C 2  k  rk1.t/  Œ1  r.t/  rk.t/„ ƒ‚ …
.1:0/
C .k  rk1.t/  Œ1  r.t//2„ ƒ‚ …
.1:1/
(5)
Re.t/ D 2  rk.t/ 
kX
iD0
k
i
!
 rki.t/  Œ1  r.t/i
„ ƒ‚ …
n:0
C 2  krk1.t/  Œ1  r.t/ 
kX
iD0
k
i
!
rki.t/  Œ1  r.t/i
„ ƒ‚ …
m:1
(6)
In case (a), we create two p-cycles, one spanning over
the inner ring and one spanning over the outer ring. The
all-terminal reliability function can be constructed as in
Equation (2). In the analysed case, we have two p-cycles:
up to 1 link may be down in each. (0:0) coefficient means
that all links work without failures (2k total links in the
topology), (1:0) coefficient means that 1 link in a p-cycle is
down and all other links work correctly (r k2 .t/ reflects the
number of links in a p-cycle without failure, r
k
2 1.t/ shows
the number of links without failures in a p-cycle with one
down link, rk.t/ indicates the number of unprotected links,
that is, placed outside the p-cycles), (1:1) coefficient means
that 1 link in the first p-cycle is down, 1 link in the sec-
ond p-cycle is down and all the other links work correctly
[r k2 1.t/ reflects the number of links without failures in
each p-cycle (here are two such p-cycles), rk.t/ considers
links placed outside the p-cycles].
In case (b), we make k=2 4-link long p-cycles. In this
scenario, all links are protected. The all-terminal reliability
function can be constructed as in Equation (3). In this case,
we have k=2 p-cycles. In each p-cycle up to 1 link may
be down. In this equation, i means the number of p-cycles
with 1 down link and k=2  i p-cycles without failures.
In case (c), there are two cycles, both traversing half of
the network. The all-terminal reliability function can be
constructed as in Equation (4). In each p-cycle, up to 1 on-
cycle link and any number of straddling links may be down.
(0:0) coefficient means that all on-cycle links work without
failures (k C 4 links, which compose p-cycles), (1:0) coef-
ficient means that 1 link in a p-cycle is down and all other
on-cycle links work correctly (r k2 C2.t/ reflects the number
of links in a p-cycle with 1 failure, rki.t/.1  r.t//i means
a straddling link - up to k2  2 in each p-cycle), (1:1) coef-
ficient means that 1 link in the first p-cycle is down, 1 link
in the second p-cycle is down and any of straddling links
may be down (. k2 C 2/r
k
2 C1.t/.1  r.t// reflects that one
on-cycle link in each p-cycle is failed, rki.t/.1  r.t//i
means a straddling link -up to k2  2 in each p-cycle).
The all-terminal reliability function for case (d) can be
constructed as in Equation (5). In this case, we have two
p-cycles; in each p-cycle up to 1 link may be down. (0:0)
coefficient means that all links work without failures (2k
links in topology), (1:0) coefficient means that 1 link in a p-
cycle is down and all the other links work correctly (rk1.t/
reflects the number of links in the p-cycle with 1 failure
and rk.t/ considers the number of links in the p-cycle with-
out failures), (1:1) coefficient means that 1 link in the first
4
Table I.MTTF values for p-cycles from Figure 2.
MTTF.MTTF˛/=MTTF˛
k case (a) case (b) case (c) case (d) case (e)
8 0.105 0.233 0.229 0.167 0.469
12 0.069 0.182 0.167 0.109 0.305
16 0.052 0.153 0.132 0.081 0.226
20 0.041 0.135 0.109 0.064 0.180
24 0.034 0.121 0.093 0.053 0.149
28 0.029 0.111 0.081 0.045 0.127
32 0.026 0.103 0.071 0.040 0.111
48 0.017 0.082 0.049 0.026 0.074
64 0.013 0.070 0.037 0.020 0.055
MTTF, Mean Time To Failure.
p-cycle is down, 1 link in the second p-cycle is down and
all the other links work correctly (rk1.t/ considers the
number of links in p-cycle with 1 failure).
The same layout as in case (d) is used in case (e),
but here, both p-cycles cooperate. Similarly, all links are
protected. The all-terminal reliability function can be con-
structed as in Equation (6). In this case, we have two
p-cycles. In each p-cycle up to k links may be down; how-
ever, at that time, only up to 1 link may be down in the
other p-cycle. (n:0) coefficient means that n, .n 6 k/ links
are down in the first p-cycle and all links work properly in
the second p-cycle (rki.t/ reflects the number of working
links in the p-cycle with failures, rk.t/ shows the number of
working links in the p-cycle without failures), (m:1) coef-
ficient means that m, .m 6 k/ links are down in the first
p-cycle and exactly 1 link is down in the second p-cycle
(rk1.t/ reflects the number of working links in the p-cycle
with one failure, rki.t/ considers the number of working
links in this p-cycle).
To obtain the exact values of MTTF of a network,
the reliability function of a single link r.t/ needs to be
known. However, as most of link failures are generated
by cable cuts, and the ageing or other physical processes
can be neglected, span failures are generally memoryless,
thus characterised by a Poisson process with the rate .
Therefore, inter-failure times can be described by an
exponential distribution with the average value MTTF˛ D
1=, where MTTF˛ represents the MTTF of a single link.
Although this value is related to the span length, to simplify
the calculations, we consider equal link lengths, therefore
equal MTTF˛ values for each link.
The MTTF of the network considered in the paper, as
a function of the number of nodes in the DRDA topol-
ogy for the cases presented in Figure 2 (numbers written
in bold show the best results) without repairs is obtained
following Equations (7)–(11). The results that show the
MTTF of the considered topology with p-cycles as a part
of link MTTF˛ are presented in Table I and illustrated
in Figure 3.
MTTFa.MTTF˛/ D 13k
2  16k C 4
8k.k  1/.2k  1/  MTTF˛ (7)
MTTFb.MTTF˛/ D
k=2X
iD0
k=2
i

4i.3/k=2i
2k  i  MTTF˛ (8)
MTTFc.MTTF˛/ D 5k
2 C 30k C 44
2.k C 2/.k C 3/.k C 4/  MTTF˛
(9)
MTTFd.MTTF˛/ D 5k
2  5k C 1
2k.k  1/.2k  1/  MTTF˛ (10)
MTTFe.MTTF˛/ D 7k.k  1/ C 2k.k  1/.2k  1/  MTTF˛ (11)
As we can see, the worst results are observed for case (a).
In this configuration, the ‘dual attachment’ links (joining
the inner and outer rings) are not protected. Therefore, each
failure cannot be repaired, and the connectivity cannot be
assured. This situation was partially and fully eliminated
in cases (c) and (d), respectively, where p-cycles protect
more/all links in the DRDA network. Because of that, the
MTTF is greater in those cases compared to case (a).
The case (b) shows that many smaller p-cycles work
better than in cases (a), (c) and (d). This observation is con-
sistent with our presumptions. If we have more p-cycles,
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10−2
10−1
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Number of nodes
M
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Figure 3. Mean Time To Failure values for p-cycles from Figure 2.
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Figure 4. Continuous-Time Markov Chains for several p-cycle conﬁgurations.
the number of links that may fail at the same time without
loosing connectivity in a network is greater. As a result,
the MTTF for such conﬁgurations is usually better. On
the other hand, the best results are observed for case (e),
with two interacting p-cycles proposed, if the number of
nodes in the network is lower or equal to 32. The size of a
DRDA network composed of 32 nodes may be very large
(it depends on span lengths). In this case, the best MTTF
values are observed because the p-cycles cover all nodes
in the network and they protect links in a coordinated way
(each link is protected by both p-cycles).
Based on the results, we can conclude that for small
DRDA networks (up to 32 nodes), the p-cycle conﬁgura-
tion shown in Figure 2(e) is the best solution. However, for
larger networks, providing many 4-link long p-cycles gives
better results in terms of MTTF. It is more probable that in
larger networks (composed of numerous number of nodes)
with only one or two p-cycles covering all nodes, two or
more failures occur at the same time in the p-cycle. If we
have more p-cycles in the same network, the probability of
disconnection is lower. This observation is characteristic to
p-cycles in general, as they are not supposed to span over
numerous hops [25].
3.2. Mean Time To Disconnection
As noted in [22], the following analysis assumes that links
in the DRDA happen to fail independently. Now, links are
assumed to be repaired by the network operator follow-
ing again the exponential distribution with rate . Now,
1 is referred to as the MTTR. The target is to ﬁnd
the Time To Disconnection probability distribution func-
tion of a generic k-DRDA topology and derive its MTTD
average value. We assume that an observed average link
failure value of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is
given and that the network operator can guarantee a certain
average link repair time given by its MTTR value.
To simplify the model, no more than four link fail-
ures are assumed to occur simultaneously, which is highly
improbable (actually less than 106 for MTBF D 60 days
and traditional MTTR values of hours and days [22]).
With these assumptions, a given k-node DRDA can be
easily characterised and analysed with respect to its reli-
ability by Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) [26].
Figure 4 shows the CTMC for the different p-cycle con-
ﬁgurations proposed in Section 2, which can be read as
follows. The generic state .n1 : : : : : ni : : : : : nf .k// gives
the number of failures on the different p-cycles, together
with the required units of backup capacity Cb for that state.
For instance, the state labelled (2:1) means that two of the
k links of one p-cycle have failed together with one of the k
links of its dual p-cycle. In such a case, 3C additional units
of backup capacity are required.
The diagram in Figure 4 also gives the transition prob-
abilities between states. For instance, transition from state
(0:0) to state (1:0) occurs with rate 2k, because this
transition occurs when any of the 2k links of the two
p-cycles fails. Transition back to state (0:0) occurs with
rate , which refers to the rate at which such a failure is
ﬁxed. For instance, transition from state (1:0) to state (1:1)
6
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Figure 5. Mean Time To Disconnection for several p-cycles configurations.
occurs with rate k (any of the k links of the dual p-cycle
fails), whereas the transition rate to state (2:0) is .k  1/
(any of the k  1 remaining links of the current p-cycle
fails). Again, transition back from state (2:1) to state (2:0)
occurs with rate 1, which refers to the fact that the fail-
ure on the dual p-cycle is recovered. The same reasoning
applies to the rest of state transition rates. Finally, the state
Disconnection is absorbing in the CTMC (there is no tran-
sition from this state to any other) and, when reached, this
state implies that some nodes in the DRDA are isolated
(disconnection state).
To compute the Time To Disconnection probability dis-
tribution from initial state .0 : : : : : 0/, it is just required to
choose the entry (.0 : : : : : 0/, Disconnection) in the matrix
A.t/ D eGt where A.t/ gives the distribution function
of the passage time between any two states of the CTMC
within the time interval Œ0, t, and matrix G is the transition
probability matrix for this chain.
Figure 5 shows the MTTD values for different k-size
DRDAs (varying from k D 8 nodes to k D 64 nodes),
for MTBF D 60 days and MTTR D 1 day. It is worth
noting that k must be a multiple of 4 in order to define
the two dual p-cycles. First of all, there is a decreasing
trend of MTTD with respect to k, as when there are more
links in the network, the probability of failure grows sig-
nificantly. Moreover, in case (e), the transition probability
to the disconnection state depends on the number of nodes,
whereas, in case (b), this probability is constant (Figure 4).
This shows that p-cycle configuration as proposed in case
(e) is suitable only for smaller networks. For instance,
an 8-node DRDA, using a collaborative p-cycle, shows
MTTD D 577 days, whereas a 32-node DRDA gives a
much smaller MTTD D 15 days.
Concerning different configurations, it can be observed
that the obtained results are similar to those presented in
the previous section. That is, the worst case is (a), where
two p-cycles without cooperation are considered. If the
number of nodes in the topology is small (less than 24),
the most resilient solution (in terms of MTTD) is case (e),
where two dual collaborative p-cycles are defined. How-
ever, for larger topologies (if the number of nodes is greater
than 24), providing many 4-link long p-cycles, that is, case
(b), gives better results in terms of MTTD.
In order to assess how MTTR influences MTTD,
Figure 6 shows the MTTD for different values of MTTR
and numbers of nodes, for the two most resilient solutions
obtained in the previous analysis, namely, case (e) and case
(b). It can be observed that case (e) is better than case (b)
for every value of MTTF (in the typical range of 0–5 days)
when k D 8 nodes, whereas if k D 16 nodes, both cases are
similar when MTTF is greater than 2 days. Finally, when
k D 32, case (b) is better than case (e) if only MTTF is
higher than 12 h.
3.3. Required backup capacity
The p-cycles presented in this paper ensure that a num-
ber of link failures may be repaired and the connectivity
between all the nodes is still secured. However, we need to
ensure additional capacity on the selected links to serve the
redirected traffic. In this section, we present the analysis of
required backup capacity in single links and in the whole
network.
n means all straddling links that may fail, n1 means
straddling links in one p-cycle that may fail and n2 means
straddling links in second p-cycle that may fail
The results of our analysis are presented in Table II. Cb
per link means how much capacity per link in each p-cycle
needs to be added to serve the additional traffic if failures
occur. On the other hand, the Cb per network shows how
much additional capacity we need to buy in the whole net-
work to serve the backup traffic. For cases (a), (b) and (d),
we need the additional C per each link in each p-cycle,
which repairs a failure. Thus, there is a need for C multi-
plied by the number of on-cycle links additional capacity
in the network. In cases (c) and (e), it is more complex to
estimate the demand on capacity, which demands on the
number of links we want to protect (in case (c), we may
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Figure 6. Mean Time To Disconnection for different combina-
tions of Mean Time to Repair and number of nodes.
protect up to one failed on-site link and all straddling links,
whereas in case (e), we may protect up to one failure in a
p-cycle and all links in the second p-cycle).
The recovery column shows how the corresponding fail-
ure is repaired. O-C means the on-cycle repair strategy,
which is used when a failure occurs in one of the links
belonging to a p-cycle; it is repaired by the alternative route
on the cycle. F-S denotes full-straddling repair strategy,
which is used when a protected off-cycle link fails; it is
repaired by the p-cycle and the traffic is balanced over two
alternative routes. S-S is the semi-straddling repair strat-
egy, which is used when a straddling link fails but the
p-cycle is not fully functional either; in this case, the redi-
rected traffic from the failed straddling link cannot be sent
over two paths, as only one is available. All the mentioned
strategies have been described in details in [22].
The results in Table II show that, when there is only one
failure of on-cycle links in a network, the best results are
observed for case (a) (where not all links are protected)
and for case (e). In case of two failures (1:1), the config-
uration (a) is the best. More failures can be repaired only
when case (b), (c) or (e) is implemented; however, in case
(c), up to one on-cycle link in each p-cycle may fail. With
the same additional capacity as in case (e), in case (b), we
may protect more links. This case is also more suitable
for bigger networks along with lower needs for additional
capacity. The analysis shows that taking into consideration
only the need for additional capacity, the (e) configuration
may be worse than the other proposals under specific con-
ditions (when not all links are protected or when p-cycles
are small and have up to one failure). On top of that,
the values of the MTTF and MTTD presented in previous
sections are significantly greater in case (e) than for the
other cases in relatively small networks. Network operators
may decide by themselves, which of the analysed p-cycle
configurations is the most suitable for them.
In case (e), we are also able to provide protection when
more links fail at the same time; yet, this cases require
much more additional capacity. However, we need to note
that the sole connectivity between all nodes in the network
is assured even when all links in one p-cycle fail. If we
do not have enough capacity to serve all redirected traffic,
the transmission will be slowed down but not disconnected.
Such an advantage is not observed for the other proposals.
If we look at the example for k D 8 and assume the
maximum of two simultaneous link failures in the network,
we can see that for cases (b), (d) and (e), which are the
most capacity consuming examples, we need to increase
each link capacity twice (in case (c), we may need even
more capacity when we decide to protect also straddling
links). In comparison to other architectures, for example,
RPR, this feature of DRDA is very good. In RPR, we also
need to multiply each link capacity by two in case of a
link failure. However, in RPR, we can repair two failures
only if they occur between two corresponding nodes. The
strong advantage of case (e) is that any two failures will
be repaired, whereas topologies (b) and (d) do not present
that feature.
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Table II. Capacity requirement comparison.
Topology Failure Recovery strategy Cb per link Cb per network
(a) (1:0) or (1:1) O-C C kC
(b) up to 1 link in each p-cycle O-C C 2kC
(c)
.0 : 0/ n F-S nC=2, n 2< 0, k  4 > .k C 4/nC=2
.1 : 0/
n1 S-S +1 O-C C C n1C .C C n1C/.k=2 C 2/
n2 F-S n2C=2 .n2C=2/.k=2 C 2/
.1 : 1/
n1 S-S +1 O-C C C n1C .C C n1C/.k=2 C 2/
n2 S-S +1 O-C C C n2C .C C n2C/.k=2 C 2/
(d) (1:0) or (1:1) O-C C 2kC
(e)
.n : 0/ with 1 6 n 6 k n F-S nC=2 knC
.1 : 1/ 2 S-S C 2kC
.m : 1/ with 2 6 m 6 k m S-S + 1 O-C .m C 1/C 2k.m C 1/C
4. CONCLUSION
The DRDA architecture is a new proposal for the high-
speed reliable transmission of data in the metropolitan area.
In such a network topology, the protection possibilities pro-
vided by implementing several link-disjoint p-cycles are
quite large. It is possible to protect each link in a topology
or only a part of them. It depends on the chosen p-cycle
configuration. Of course, the more links we protect, the
more reliable network is. The results presented in this paper
confirm this statement.
This work provides a reliability analysis for the most
sensible p-cycle configurations in the considered DRDA
topology. In order to assess the reliability of DRDA, MTTF
and MTTD indicators were used. As shown, when the
number of nodes is small, two dual p-cycles with coop-
eration provide the best solution in terms of both MTTF
and MTTD. However, for large topologies (more than
24 nodes), it is generally a better solution to split the
protection rings into several small 4-link p-cycles.
The DRDAs with 24 nodes may also be quite large.
Our observations indicate that ring-based networks with
12 (which corresponds to 24 nodes in DRDAs) or larger
number of nodes are rarely used. The studies presented
in this paper confirm that, in most cases, two interwork-
ing p-cycles should be used to protect links in the DRDA
networks. It is worth to note that in this case, we protect
more links in comparison to the other solutions. More-
over, even if we do not have enough capacity to serve
all redirected traffic, we still ensure connectivity between
all nodes. In such a case, traffic is sent only with a
lower rate. Finally, the network administrators are free to
choose how much additional capacity they want to inject
in their networks. More spare capacity generates costs but
improves reliability.
This information is of special interest for network oper-
ators when they have to deploy a protection mechanism in
their MAN, which demand full-time any-to-any connectiv-
ity, such as the networks that distribute Internet Protocol
television (IPTV) services.
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